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The Impotence of Delaware’s Taxes: A Short Response to Professor 
Barzuza’s Delaware’s Compensation 
Forthcoming, In Brief, The Online Magazine of the Virginia Law Review 
M. Todd Henderson  
 Perhaps the most hackneyed and intractable debate in all of business law 
is the one about whether Delaware has incentives to provide an optimal corporate 
law, whatever that is. The world seems divided into the race-to-the-topers and 
the race-to-the-bottomers, with increasing amounts of scholarship piling up on 
both sides, none of which seems to be convincing the other side or moving policy 
forward in a meaningful way. When asked to respond to the latest salvo in this 
battle, my initial reaction was, “Oh no! Not another paper on states racing.” But 
after reading Professor Michal Barzuza’s thought-provoking article – Delaware’s 
Compensation – I’m convinced that there are still interesting things to be said 
about the optimality of the state-as-competitor-for-charters model of modern 
American corporate governance. I don’t find Professor Barzuza’s proposal for 
making the franchise tax proportional to firm value convincing or necessarily 
desirable, but, because of the natural check provided by state competition, it is 
unlikely to do much harm. 
In her words, Professor Barzuza’s thesis is as follows: 
If Delaware’s [franchise] tax were more sensitive to 
firm value, or if Delaware increased its tax to reflect 
changes in the quality of its law, the state would have 
better incentives to invest in quality, even in the 
absence of competition, because Delaware would be 
rewarded for such changes with higher tax 
collections.1 
The idea is that the current system – basically a flat fee of $165,000 for large 
firms – does not provide legislators with sufficient incentives to overcome the 
ability of managers to lobby for management-friendly legislation. Professor 
Barzuza claims that managers dominate the process of incorporation (both at the 
IPO and reincorporation stages), and that legislators rationally favor them over 
shareholders, in part because the benefits from favoring managers are real and 
sizable, while increasing shareholder value doesn’t do much to attract or keep 
firms, and doesn’t increase the state’s take of $165,000 per firm. 
 Professor Barzuza’s paper makes an important point – taxes are not only a 
form of regulation, but also can be an incentive to efficient regulation.2 To see 
                                                        
  Assistant Professor, University of Chicago Law School. 
 1 Michal Barzuza, Delaware’s Compensation, 94 VA. L. REV. 521, 549 (2008). 
 2 Alternatively, one might think that taxes are a substitute for regulation, since in most 
cases regulation decreases firm profitability and taxes are effectively a proxy for government 
ownership of a firm. In the case of corporate law, Professor Barzuza claims that regulations and 
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this, compare two worlds in which there is a single legislator who writes the rules 
for firm governance. In the first, much like modern-day Delaware, the legislator 
receives a flat fee from each firm to spend on public goods; and in the second, 
much like Professor Barzuza’s imagined Delaware, the legislator receives a large 
percentage of firm profits (say 50%) that the legislator can dole out to 
constituents. All things else being equal, it is obvious that the legislator in the 
second world has a stronger incentive to increase firm value, as the benefits flow 
directly to the legislator.  
 It is difficult to object to this claim at a theoretical level, since it may 
improve incentives for legislators on the margin and if the legislators set the rate 
too high or enact changes that actually destroy shareholder value, companies will 
simply move to Maryland or lobby Delaware to change back. My guess is, 
however, that the impact of such a dramatic3 change in tax law is likely to be 
trivial (and potentially harmful for Delaware) for two reasons.  
I. 
First, Professor Barzuza’s proposal omits any analysis of the legislative 
process that a proportional tax is designed to influence. There are two parts to 
this, roughly corresponding to the supply and demand of legislation. Legislators 
supply legislation, but Professor Barzuza offers no account of legislator motives 
to explain why the increase in state revenues that would come from a 
proportional tax would benefit the marginal Delaware legislator. On the other 
side of the coin, managers are part of the demand for corporate law legislation, 
but they too are missing from Professor Barzuza’s calculus. Let’s consider each of 
these in turn. 
A. 
Professor Barzuza notes that “Delaware” will be rewarded with higher 
taxes and this will encourage it to enact optimal (or more optimal) legislation. 
The problem is that Delaware doesn’t act but through its legislators, and these 
legislators are missing in Professor Barzuza’s account. Without a coherent claim 
about how legislators respond to the various incentives created by the parties in 
the legislative process, the argument she makes is less persuasive. The point here 
is simply that once we move from the single-legislator example above to a multi-
member body, the calculus of weighing the benefits from a change in corporate 
governance is more complex. For example, do legislators only care about the size 
of the public fisc? Perhaps for some legislators sitting on key committees, the 
ability to pass out goodies to constituents may help them get reelected, but for 
others the opposite may be true. Legislators face constituencies with 
heterogeneous preferences, not all of which will view increased state revenues as 
                                                                                                                                                                     
taxes are compliments, not substitutes, because certain governance regulations do not lower but 
rather increase firm value. 
 3 Professor Barzuza admits the new tax policy would be a radical change, when she claims 
that the federal government might be needed to force the change on an unwilling Delaware. 
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positive. Assuming that the utility function of the marginal legislator rises with 
increased tax revenues seems, at the best, overly simplistic. Isn’t it just as likely 
that legislators in multi-member bodies might care about maximizing other 
things, for example, their likelihood of being reelected or their personal influence 
or prestige? And, if this is true, what about passing shareholder-wealth-
maximizing legislation increases these? 
Legislators who couldn’t take credit for increased state revenues or 
wouldn’t want to would not be influenced by a proportional tax. One might argue 
that for the latter group that the state could use the increased cash from the taxes 
raised from firms to reduce taxes on other entities, like individuals. But this 
account needs a theory of why increased taxes on firms relative to individuals is 
more efficient. Optimizing the mix of tax funding sources is a difficult calculation, 
considering the relative ability of firms and individuals to evade taxes (say, 
through structuring, compliance, or leaving the jurisdiction entirely), the impact 
on incentives to produce (that is, the choice between work and consuming 
leisure), the impact on other tax burdens, such as federal taxes and sales taxes, 
and so on. Substituting corporate taxes for individual taxes might seem desirable, 
but it could lead to unintended consequences or dry up the tax base in ways that 
might be difficult to replace because of the political stickiness of tax rates for 
individuals or corporations.  
Another problem on the supply side is the uncertainty about incentives for 
legislators to prefer tax revenues over the number of firms incorporated in 
Delaware. There may in fact be an inverse correlation between the number of 
charters and the maximization of revenue, and the marginal legislator might 
sensibly prefer to have more companies chartered in Delaware than to maximize 
the treasury (or minimize other tax burdens). Maximizing the number of firms 
may mean more work for lawyers, judges, and other service providers in 
Delaware, and thus increase campaign contributions to and the prestige of 
legislators responsible for the attracting firms there. The public choice 
calculations about what legislators maximize is far from clear and not obviously 
pointed in the direction of “better” firm governance, even in a world of increased 
monetary incentives for the state as a whole.  
B.  
Professor Barzuza’s account also leaves out managers from the legislation 
process, and thus overestimates the potential impact the increased revenues will 
have on overall legislative incentives. Professor Barzuza notes that managers are 
powerful players in the current legislative process (in fact, strong enough to 
distort it in perverse ways), but then underestimates the role they will have in 
objecting to any legislation designed to increase shareholder value but that will 
destroy manager value. This is especially odd, since the argument for the tax 
change is premised on how powerful managers are. Why would this power to 
influence legislators wane under a new tax regime? Presumably the answer is 
because the legislators now have a larger incentive (because of the increased tax 
revenues) to resist the managers. But one has to compare the relative impact of 
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the new tax revenues and the power of managers in the new world, and it isn’t at 
all clear that the new incentives will be anywhere near high powered enough to 
make a difference. If managers are powerful enough to resist improvements in 
the law that would increase shareholder value as significant as Professor Barzuza 
believes are possible, taxes are unlikely to do anything to change this. To see this, 
consider a simple example.  
Let’s say the Delaware legislature is considering a bill that would require 
firms to destagger their boards. Professor Barzuza cites evidence suggesting that 
this would increase shareholder value by $40 billion. We must consider the gains 
to legislators from both passage and defeat of particular legislation. If the bill is 
passed, Delaware’s treasury will receive $40 billion times some tax rate, T. 
Legislators who vote for the bill will benefit derivatively from this, receiving some 
benefit, B, for increasing state revenues. B is, by definition, less than $40 billion 
times T, since the gains are divided up among many legislators, there exists some 
question about which legislators get “credit” for bills, and because the money is 
flowing to the state (and the people) instead of directly to the legislators 
themselves. 
Managers will try to influence legislators too, by delivering benefits, call 
them B*, to individual legislators. We can measure the upper bound of this 
influence by estimating the value managers would have from maintaining the 
status quo. Professor Barzuza claims that firms, acting through managers, do not 
have incentives to destagger their own boards, because managers prefer the 
private benefits of control, which would be diminished if the board were 
destaggered. To put a dollar amount on these private benefits, one need only 
estimate the dollar gains managers would share with shareholders if the board 
were destaggered. Assuming managers own, on average, 5% of firm shares, the 
managers would gain about $2 billion from the change ($40 billion x 5%), and 
thus the private benefits of control must exceed that amount. This means 
managers would be willing to pay over $2 billion to avoid the legal change; this is 
the upper limit of B*.  
To determine whether legislators will have incentives to pass shareholder-
friendly legislation, we simply compare B* to B. B* is likely to be much greater 
than B for an individual legislator, if for no reason other than that B* is a direct 
benefit, while B is an indirect one in most cases. In fact, the directness of the 
benefit for legislators may be one reason why managers are able to currently 
exert a disproportionate influence on legislators compared with diffuse (and 
generally disinterested) shareholders.  
This approach also allows us to estimate the tax rate necessary for B to 
exceed B*. As noted above, the managers would be willing to “pay” $2 billion to 
legislators to avoid this law to preserve their private benefits of control.4 In the 
                                                        
4 Managers would likely pay, say through campaign contributions, lobbying, charitable 
donations, or other means, to defeat the bill. Campaign finance laws are obviously relevant here, 
but managers can use a variety of mechanisms to deliver B* to legislators, including ones clearly 
outside of the reach of even the toughest election laws.  
  5
extreme, this means that the tax rate, T, would have to exceed 5% for legislators 
to favor the bill. This is a ridiculously large increase in the tax rate, and one that 
would not be politically feasible.  
II. 
 Second, even assuming that these issues are solved, there remains the 
question about how realistic it is for legislators to make judgments about what 
does and does not increase shareholder value. At some level, this is what 
legislators are supposed to do, but Delaware’s corporate code is remarkably 
devoid of the governance gimmicks and the legislators have no experience in this 
policy making area. The conceit of the current code is to leave it up to the parties 
to contract from a bare base to those changes that will improve value. Although 
the supposition that parties will actually bargain or have incentives to strike 
efficient deals may be questioned, it is not at all clear that legislative incentives 
are the problem. After all, how are legislators to measure the merit of various 
academic studies suggesting governance improvements? The literature is rife 
with claims that doing X, Y, or Z will improve shareholder value, but also 
counterclaims on the merits or on theoretical grounds. Empirical scholarship is 
increasingly impenetrable by non-specialists, and, in the event of hearings on the 
merits of X, Y, or Z, we can be confident there will be as many adamant pros as 
cons, and even more estimates on the potential impact on firm value. 
 In addition, there is no way for legislative judgments about the impact of 
X, Y, or Z to be evaluated ex post, since numerous other variables, like general 
economic conditions, competition in the industry, and other regulations, may 
impact firm profitability. This means that there will be no (or a very noisy) 
feedback on the efficacy of governance changes and the merits of the proportional 
tax scheme. This will make legislation in subsequent periods claiming benefits to 
be less certain, and it may also undermine the political support for the tax or for 
particular governance changes, since causation will be so uncertain. 
 These problems simply raise the question of why legislators should prefer 
making these judgments instead of firm owners and managers. It is unlikely that 
the sum of decision costs and error costs is less for legislators/courts than for 
managers/shareholders. Legislators simply have no experience doing this kind of 
analysis given the history of corporate law legislation in Delaware. Moving to a 
new paradigm of making governance choices will need to overcome this 
deficiency in skills and information, as well as just the inertia of the current 
system. This means that the incentives, especially at the beginning of the new 
regime, will have to be much higher than would be necessary in equilibrium. As a 
result, the political resistance to getting this plan started may be greater than 
what one would think if just evaluating the steady-state case, thus making new 
regime less likely than it would otherwise be if Delaware legislators routinely 
made these kinds of calculations. 
Unlike legislators, firm stakeholders are betting their own money, careers, 
and reputations, and are likely to know the idiosyncratic circumstances of their 
  6
firms. Firm-specific changes in governance are more likely to be narrowly 
tailored to firm and/or industry circumstances, are more likely to be capable of ex 
post analysis and reconciliation, and are more responsive to market forces that 
will weed out good from bad governance choices. In addition, the firm may be the 
only sensible locus of judging governance. Studies showing that certain 
governance changes (e.g., smaller boards or separating the chair and CEO roles) 
will increase firm value may be biased by omitting unobservable variables at a 
firm level,5 and therefore may be yielding false results or ones that are not 
generalizable across all firms. 
In light of these problems, delegating this job to legislators seems sensible 
only if the other mechanisms for enacting governance changes that will increase 
firm value (while not doing other harms) are irretrievably broken. Instead of 
giving the power to legislators, who know less than managers, shareholders, and 
creditors, why not advocate repealing the Williams Act, changing the rules about 
how firms repay costs in proxy battles, or any number of other reforms that 
would keep the burden on firm stakeholders to make these decisions.  
III. 
 Professor Barzuza’s insight makes an important contribution to how we 
think about the interplay between taxes and regulation, and what we view as the 
most appropriate ways to optimize corporate default rules. The changes she 
envisions are unlikely to overcome the managerial power she presupposes, 
however, and, in any event, are a clear second best to a world of few mandatory 
rules and lots of freedom of contract about governance. Focusing on improving 
mechanisms of private ordering seems like a more sensible way of improving 
corporate governance than getting caught in legislative battles over governance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Readers with comments should address them to: 
 
Professor M. Todd Henderson 
University of Chicago Law School 
1111 East 60th Street 
Chicago, IL  60637 
 toddh@uchicago.edu 
                                                        
5 See, for example, Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, “Boards of Directors as 
an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature,” (June 15, 2000), 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=233111 or DOI:  10.2139/ssrn.233111 (arguing that 
governance is endogenous and studies claiming causal links between performance and 
governance are plagued by unobserved variables). 
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